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SYNOPSIS
This paper is an analysis of recent Muslim violence in southern Thailand and will place it in the 
context of a broader discussion of Thai identity, with reference to historic precedents and some 
examples of Thai policy toward its Malay Muslim population. The position of Malay Muslims 
has been complicated by international narratives regarding Islam. This analysis focuses on the 
way Thai government policies towards Malay Muslims in the south have served to exacerbate 
tensions and draw inappropriate parallels with Islamic conflicts elsewhere in the world. 
Introduction
In the opening scenes of the 2003 film, Baytong, 
(dir. Nonzee Nimibutr) a community of monks, se-
questered in a forest temple, begin their day by per-
forming the solemn, ritualistic routines of the morn-
ing: sweeping the leaves of the mango tree from the 
stone floor of the temple, hand-washing and dying their 
robes. The morning light suffuses the sequence in a 
gold sheen of contemplative silence. It is clear that we 
are in rural, Buddhist Thailand, and it is a scene which 
is  found at dawn throughout the kingdom on any given 
day.
The next sequence of the film is set on a train pulling 
into a station. A woman is  traveling with her young 
daughter.  Hawkers are offering food and merchandise 
through the open windows of the train, people are dis-
embarking and boarding, and the mood is light and 
cheerful.
The style of dress is markedly different from central 
and northern Thailand, with women wearing hijab and 
men wearing distinctly Malay costumes. This  is  in the 
south of Thailand, a place differentiated from the Bud-
dhist scenes earlier in the film. Suddenly,  in a brief and 
startling instant, a bomb concealed in a Singha beer 
case rips through the passenger train compartment, 
killing a woman who had just been waving to some 
friends on the platform. It is the defining moment of 
the story, as it lures Tamm, a monk and brother of the 
woman killed in the attack, out of the Buddhist monas-
tery and into the world in order to make sense of the 
violence that typifies what has been occurring regularly 
in Thailand’s troubled south for the past several years.
The film is, essentially, an exploration of the conflict 
between Thai national identity and the nation’s Muslim 
population in the south, particularly the provinces of 
Pattani 1,  Yala and Narathiwat. Baytong refers to an 
ampoe (a subdivision of the jangwat)2 in the province 
of Yala.  The film succeeds in its  portrayal of the intri-
cacies of the political and social problems in the south 
that arise from separatist energies that are the result of 
a long-standing identity crisis that has divided the Ma-
lay Muslims from the Thai  Buddhists since Patani was a 
separate kingdom, one governed by Malay traditions 
and periodically either at odds with the Thai crown, or 
engaged in a vassal relationship with Bangkok.
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The film is a powerful evocation of the elements that 
have served to undermine Muslim-Buddhist relations 
in this region, and which are predicated upon ideas  of 
nationalism, identity, disparity and inequality. In addi-
tion, the film shows in great detail the differences be-
tween Malay Muslims and Thai Buddhists. For exam-
ple,  the muezzin call to prayer in the small southern 
town occurs throughout the film, in sequences which 
suggest the overarching community to which the 
southern Muslims belong and which have the same 
function as the carefully proscribed rituals of Buddhist 
devotion seen within the opening sequence. The film 
covers questions of conversion, such as a Buddhist 
Thai  woman to Islam, so that she can marry the princi-
pal antagonist. And all this occurs as well as the com-
plex relationship of cross-border trade at the Malaysian 
border with the political and economic realities of 
Thailand’s deep south. 
This paper will contain evidence of the complex na-
ture of the problems in Thailand’s south. It will dem-
onstrate the ways in which the relationship between 
Thai  Muslims and the majority Thai Buddhists has 
evolved in southern Thailand, with an examination of 
the limits that have been imposed by the Buddhist re-
gime,  particularly in areas of education,  language re-
quirements, and media influence. It will attempt to 
determine how these developments have shaped and 
defined the current conflict and what policies,  if any, 
might be pursued by the Thai  government to amelio-
rate the unrest,  pacify the southern provinces and/or 
construct a progressive dialogue of rapprochement, 
despite numerous policy decisions that have resulted in 
continued apathy, resentment, and calls for insurrec-
tion. 
The Muslim minority in southern Thailand,  while of 
Malay origins and possessing a culture that is  distinct 
from the dominant Buddhist culture found throughout 
Thailand, has recently become the focus of  more in-
tense international scrutiny,  as a result of sporadic 
violence and consequent repression by former Prime 
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s  administration.  Mus-
lims comprise 3.8% of a population of 65,444,371.3 
However, displays of violent discontent have not been 
the result of an international Muslim agitation fueled 
by Western foreign policy in the Muslim lands of  the 
Middle East and Israeli  policies in Palestine. Rather, 
they are localized expressions in keeping with ambi-
tions that are restricted to Thai political divisions and 
to the issue of separatism. Enmeshed with the distinct 
political ambitions of southern Malay/Thais are con-
cepts fundamental to the differentiation of Thai Mus-
lims and Thai Buddhists: what comprises Thai identity, 
what policies affect or determine Thai identity, what is 
central to identity and political thought and action, and 
finally, to what extent does internal colonialism offer a 
viable way of explaining the Thai government’s posi-
tion toward the southern provinces?
However, unrest has plagued the south of Thailand 
for many years, indeed well before when the British 
divided Malaya along the current Thailand-Malaysia 
border in a treaty between Siam and Britain in the early 
part of the twentieth century. While this paper will 
explore the ways in which Thai identity has been 
formed relative to its Muslim population, it will also 
seek the fundamental reasons for the more recent vio-
lence and synthesize the connections to Islamic resur-
gence patterns in a global context.
Approach
This paper will consist of  an analysis of recent Mus-
lim violence in southern Thailand and will place it in 
the context of a broader discussion of Thai identity, 
with reference to historic precedents and some exam-
ples of Thai policy toward the Malay Muslim popula-
tion. As a result of modern political and social devel-
opments in Thailand that are unfolding rapidly in in-
ternational media, the thesis stated here will be ex-
plained primarily in accordance with the disciplines of 
history and political science, and will be qualitative in 
nature. 
Historical Precedents for Interaction 
between Thai Muslims and Thai 
Buddhists
Siamese influence had once reached as far south as 
Terengganu and Kedah in modern Malaysia since the 
thirteenth century onward, and powerful kingdoms and 
subsequent sultanates existed on the Malay Peninsula 
well before then. However, the geography of southern 
Thailand, used here to signify its current “geo-body” 
as politically and internationally recognized,  was essen-
tially defined by the treaty with the British. This distin-
guished Malay territory from Siam in the vocabulary of 
the nascent nation-state of what is now Thailand by 
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creating a measurable border south of  Pat-
tani  across the Malaysian peninsula, demar-
cating what is now its geopolitical territory. 
The Anglo-Siamese treaty (1909) signified 
Siam’s cessation of  territory which included 
Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah, and Perlis to 
British control in order to preserve inde-
pendence from colonial rule by pacifying the 
British. Similar treaties were signed with the 
French, including the Franco-Siamese treaty 
of 1893, and the Franco-Siamese treaty of 
1904, but in regard to Thailand’s territory in 
what is now Laos and Cambodia.4  These 
concessions at the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury reified Siamese “national” identity in 
ways previously not “imagined” in the fullest 
sense of Benedict Anderson’s text on the 
subject5. 
These southern territories, which were 
ceded to Britain under the terms of the 
Anglo-Siamese treaty, were in essence sul-
tanates, ruled in accordance with Malay cus-
tom and Islamic traditions. The region to the 
north of the newly created border represented the to-
tality of the Malay-Muslim population in Thailand. And 
it is here that current violence, and an environment 
that supports separatist ideology and suffers from une-
qual resource allocation, as well as disparities in educa-
tional and career opportunities,  have combined to cre-
ate measurable problems for the central Thai  authori-
ties in Bangkok.
In his book Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-
Body of Siam (1994), Thongchai Winichakul illustrates 
the ways in which borders were imposed on Thailand, 
not only in accordance with the terms of political trea-
ties and in reaction to colonial territorial ambitions, 
but also in conceptual terms. The Thais’ unique system 
of understanding territorial relationships was contrary 
to the advances of cartography in the nineteenth cen-
tury. Complicating the picture of southern Thailand 
then, is that within the imposed nation-state of Siam, 
power structures were altered and along with them the 
“imagined” borders that segmented the kingdom from 
its vassal states. Authority was no longer conveyed 
from the king to his vassal realms (which had their own 
systems of recognition of authority and legitimacy), but 
was colonially determined from external pressures, 
particularly British colonial ambitions in Malaya. 
Thongchai writes: 
The territorial delimitation of Siam was much more 
complicated when a border was not a corridor but a 
frontier town regarded as common to more than 
one kingdom. A modern boundary was not possible 
until what belonged to whose realm had been 
sorted out. But the premodern polity defied such a 
modern undertaking. Confrontations and controver-
sies over the question of what we might call ‘sover-
eignty’ over the Shan states, Lanna, Cambodia, the 
Malay states, and the left bank of the Mekong were 
critical to the formation of the modern Thai state 
and its misunderstood history.6
There existed in Siamese and Malay interactions a 
cycle of submission and resistance that began well be-
fore the period analyzed in Thongchai’s work. Indeed, 
as early as the seventeenth century, the vassal realms 
that paid obeisance and fealty to the Siamese king en-
gaged in protracted struggles that initiated the patterns 
that would remain in place from the pre-modern period 
until today. In an article describing the relationship 
between the Sultanate of Terengganu and the Siamese 
crown, Barbara Andaya notes that “attempts by de-
pendencies were more likely to occur when a state was 
geographically distant from the overlord,  especially if 
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the cultural ties between them were tenuous. Such 
vassals were also more likely to fall within the sphere of 
another powerful kingdom or to drift when their suze-
rain was weak.”7 Andaya further details the use of coer-
cive force by the Siamese to ensure that the tributary 
relationship by and between Siam and the Malay sul-
tanates remained strong, but suggests here that geo-
graphical distance and cultural distance were mitigat-
ing factors in undermining this relationship. Indeed, 
cultural distance is one of the defining features of the 
recent resurgence in violence in the south today, and 
may be underwritten by the growing economic influ-
ence,  rather than simply the military strength of Bang-
kok.
In addition to the case of Terengannu in the eight-
eenth century, the Sultanate of Patani, once a powerful 
commercial center and locus for Islamic teachings, was 
held in similar patterns of vassalage to Siam beginning 
as early as the sixteenth century.  In an analysis of the 
pattern of tribute established in the relationship be-
tween Siam and the Malay sultanates of the south, 
Moshe Yegar proposes that the political and military 
strength of Siam determined whether the Malay sultan-
ates, including Patani, paid tribute to Siam. He writes, 
“Patani provided Siam with forced-labor levies until 
1564 when Siam suffered a defeat by Burma, and the 
practice was brought to halt. It was not until 1631 that 
the Siamese again received bunga mas dan perak 
[tributary gifts] from Patani. Shortly afterward, when 
Patani achieved independence, the dispatch of forced 
labor ceased until 1679 when it was resumed until the 
middle of the eighteenth century, along with other 
Malay Sultanates.”8  Citing a military defeat at the 
hands of the Burmese in 1564, Yegar concludes that 
this is  a time when Patani  discontinued its forced labor 
levies. In effect, the pattern of tributary recognition on 
part of  the Malay sultanates in the sixteenth century 
appears to have been influenced by the waning and 
waxing strength of the Siamese kingdom, but was miti-
gated by distance as well. Sultanates closer to Siamese 
territory tended to be more directly affected by its 
shifting fortunes and military power.
Ethnic Politics and Thai Nationalist 
Policies in Thai History
It is within the modern nation-state of Thailand, 
then, that the Malays in the south,  isolated as they are 
from Malay and Muslim culture, form their identity 
against the Thai Buddhist majority. That identity for-
mation becomes more concrete in terms of the Thai 
majority (which is Buddhist and has historically con-
sidered itself a subject of the Thai king). The minority 
Muslim Malays living within Thailand’s modern bor-
ders, whose allegiance had been to the sultans of their 
history, found that relationship now superseded by 
Thai “national” interests.
David Wyatt suggests that the reign of King Rama V, 
(King Chulalongkorn) marked the beginnings of offi-
cial Thai nationalism with the introduction of policies 
that enforced and reified it. Primarily, religious and 
educational structures were introduced which in turn 
codified Thai identity in such a way as to exclude non-
Buddhists and non-Thai speakers. Primary education 
became more standardized in accordance with King 
Rama V’s Ministry of  Public Instruction in the country-
side, while standardized script and language (Bangkok 
Thai) became the lingua franca of the kingdom. Wyatt 
writes:
With these religious and educational changes came 
the development of a new civic sense. To a certain 
extent it sprang naturally from the changes, from 
sharing in a common religious tradition and educa-
tional experience. Both constituted new modes of 
social communication, those means by which a 
society becomes conscious of its own identity. The 
schools, the temples, and the contacts with gov-
ernment officials—all reinforced the idea that all 
inhabitants of Siam were subjects of a single king, 
members of a single body politic. For the time be-
ing, these ideas were expressed primarily in hierar-
chical terms analogous to the old patron-client rela-
tionship that pervaded the traditional society. All 
the inhabitants of Siam – including countless non-
Siamese, as we shall see—were now clients of the 
same patron, the king. Obligations once owed a 
patron were now owed the king: loyalty, obedience, 
taxes, military service, education, proper behavior. 
In return, the king owed them security, protection, 
justice, compassion, help in time of need, moral 
example, and so on. This basic idea was, in a sense, 
a compromise between the old concept of the ‘sub-
ject,’ stripped of the intermediaries that stood be-
tween the king and the peasant, and the modern 
concept of the ‘citizen.’ It combined elements of 
both, and the contradictions inherent in the combi-
nation remained to worry history subsequently.9
While the “official nationalism”10  of King Chula-
longkorn’s reign served to centralize Thai  identity and 
codify it in real terms, the Malays in the south already 
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adhered to structures that served to reinforce their 
identity.  They spoke Malay dialects, they had educa-
tional associations predicated upon Islam and the study 
of the Koran (the pondok schools), and they showed 
fealty to the sultan in a patron-client relationship simi-
lar to the Thai monarchical model.  It was in the at-
tempts to impose policies from Bangkok under the 
aegis of official nationalism that resulted in conflict.
During the reign of King Vajiravudh (King Rama 
VI),  a rebellion broke out in the Malay south that was 
caused, in part, by new tax requirements in 1922, and 
in 1923. Because the resistance demonstrations as-
sumed political and religious tones and were directed 
against policies imposed from Bangkok, and since 
these policies risked attracting British attention, King 
Vajiravudh redressed the situation by reducing taxes 
and requiring a new set of laws and regulations that 
took into consideration the role of Islam in the south. 
The period from 1923 to 1938, therefore,  was a period 
of relative calm.11 
The events in Thai history following the coup in 1932 
that replaced the absolute monarch with martial law 
exacerbated the Malay situation in the south with the 
consequent nationalism of Field Marshall Phibun 
Songkram’s government, which lasted between 1938-
1944 and again between 1948-1957.  Phibun’s reigns as 
prime minister of Thailand were marked by a distinct 
revival of Thai national interest in the southern Malay 
provinces – a continuation of  absolute political author-
ity that had been mirrored in the monarchy. Partly the 
result of  the external threat of  Communism, and partly 
the result of the nationalistic mythology of Phibun and 
its accompanying xenophobia and paranoia, the Malays 
again became the target of aggressive nationalistic 
goals and policies. 
For example, during Phibun’s  second government 
(1948-1957) in the context of  the Cold War, the Malays 
experienced outright martial law and revisions in the 
relationship between the Malay provinces and the new 
military rulers  in Bangkok. Wyatt summarizes the his-
torical precedents for the current crisis in the south 
with vivid clarity:
While ideas of northeastern Lao separatism during 
this period may have engaged the fancy of a hand-
ful of politicians and Free Thai activists, much 
more serious developments were occurring in the 
Malay provinces of the south. The efforts by 
Phibun’s government late in the war to enforce the 
Cultural Mandates and to substitute Siamese for 
Islamic law had provoked serious resistance with 
strong popular support. The Khuang and Thamrong 
governments lessened the pressures, but new issues 
arose with the application in the south of the educa-
tional policies that had been aimed primarily 
against the Chinese—Malay schooling was forbid-
den. Malays in the south felt like subjects of an 
alien colonial regime and, in August 1947, submit-
ted to the government a list of demands, calling for 
regional administrative, education, fiscal, religious, 
linguistic, and judicial autonomy.12 
Phibun’s  heavy-handed tactics established a long-
term pattern with regard to Bangkok’s authority over 
the Malay Muslim minority. The history of this period 
is  important, because it sets the stage for the conflict 
with Malay Muslims in the south at present. Wyatt fur-
ther explains:
Luang Tamrong’s government had promised the 
petitioners sympathetic consideration of their 
grievances; but Phibun’s response on coming to 
power was the arrest and imprisonment of the chief 
Malay leaders in the four provinces and the outlaw-
ing of Malay and Islamic organizations. By April 
1948, there was large-scale insurgency in the south, 
put down by government troops with massive force 
that included aerial bombardment. There was much 
sympathy in Malaya for the dissidents’ plight, but 
the onset of major and predominantly Chinese 
Communist insurgency against the British Malayan 
government in mid-1948, impinging on the border 
region, required cooperation between the Malayan 
and the Thai governments and resulted in the con-
centration of much military force and attention in 
the region with Western support. This contributed 
to the isolation and long-term muting of Malay 
dissidence.13
It is clear that Cold War mentality and ideology per-
vaded Southeast Asia, and that Thailand’s reaction to 
Communists within the country, particularly during 
the period in which Communism was gaining a foot-
hold from Vietnam across mainland Southeast Asia, 
also shaped its policies toward Muslims in the south. 
The apparatus, then, of a firm government policy that 
mirrored colonial administration (but was projected 
internally from the capital) became fixed at this time, 
under the umbrella of fears of  nascent Communist 
movements. 
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Integration versus Separatism: 
Factors of Integration as Defined by 
Thai Policy 
The policies that are favored by the Thai administra-
tion with regard to Muslims in the south of Thailand 
have all been tailored toward accommodating and in-
corporating the southern provinces into a homoge-
nized and centralized Thai identity. To this end, the 
policies have centered around four major elements: the 
use of national media to broadcast Thai national ideol-
ogy and programming, an educational policy that in-
cludes Thai language instruction and nationalist his-
tory, offers of development incentives and aid packages 
to bring economic levels up to national parity, and the 
use of police and military pressure to ensure compli-
ance with policy. Unfortunately, these approaches have 
been all historically fraught with problems and fail to 
take into account the disparate approaches to culture-
based systems of knowledge and self-identity between 
Malay and Thai nationalisms. 
The Use of Media
The media plays a central role in legitimizing nation-
alistic identity programs and communicating such 
identity across various ethnic lines in Thailand. In an 
interesting study, Annette Hamilton looked at the ways 
in which Thai media is broadcast to the south as a way 
of reinforcing Thai identity.  It is but one of the tools 
that the Thai government has employed to ensure that 
the Malays in the southern provinces begin to see 
themselves as Thais primarily. Indeed, the inherent 
flaws in this policy are in keeping with Benedict Ander-
son’s view of national identity formation in the first 
place – that it is delimited by rhetorical ambiguities and 
is  transmitted via print-capital. For example, Hamilton 
writes:
In the case of the Malay-Muslims of southern Thai-
land, the emergence and transformation of their 
own distinctive local cultures cannot be mapped by 
the existence of either national or transnational 
media environments. What it is to be a person in 
that space and time is constructed from historical 
memory and the negotiation of an everyday life-
world and the values placed on local practices of 
distinction, rather than from a hegemonic national 
community, imagined, or imaginary, let alone one 
encountered only on television.14
As a policy, the media fails to articulate Thai identity 
to Malays in the south because it does not take into 
account the complexities of ethnic identity formation, 
and that national identity is defined through Buddhism 
and the Thai language. In addition, it underestimates 
or simply discredits  the strengths of existing institu-
tions in the south, particularly those that are most suc-
cessful in resisting proposals from the government, 
e.g., secularization, modernization and linguistic man-
dates. The hegemonic Thai identity seeks to consoli-
date minority groups within its dictated vision of itself 
by way of inducement, media projection and, failing 
these methods, military and police force.  Indeed, in 
Hamilton’s research,  she found that Thailand’s policy 
communicated by way of national media has had little 
effect on the “hearts and minds” of Muslims in the 
south. She writes:
There has, however, been consistent resistance 
from Muslims in the south embracing Thai televi-
sion, something which the Thais find both amusing 
and infuriating. One very famous story, constantly 
told to me during my fieldwork, concerned the role 
of the 5th Army (the Southern Region) in encourag-
ing television viewing during the early 1980s. This 
very powerful and important segment of the na-
tional security forces was detailed to deliver free 
television sets to villages across Yala province. 
They drove in with their vehicles loaded with tele-
vision sets and technicians, who were supposed to 
set them up in the houses of village headmen and 
other local leaders, including religious leaders. But 
the villagers refused and insisted they did not want 
television sets. They loaded them back onto the 
trucks and the 5th Army was obliged to take them 
away again. The principle point of this story, from 
the Thai teller’s view, was that Muslims were de-
monstrably stupid; if they did not want the free 
television sets, at least they could have accepted 
them and then sold them later for a profit.15
The Muslims’ resistance to the television sets is a 
remarkable example of the ways cultural resistance has 
functioned in the south. But the anecdote also reveals 
much about Thai-Buddhist attitudes toward, and per-
ceptions of, Muslims. The Malays of the south had little 
need for Thai  television, since they speak a different 
language, share a distinct cultural “thought-world,” 
and rely on traditional forms of education and religious 
development. The free televisions were intended to 
serve Thai nationalist purposes but were incongruent 
with Malay-Muslim traditions and religious strictures 
which viewed television consumption as sinful. The 
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anecdote also reveals the disparity in the value systems 
between Muslims and Buddhists. Because the Muslims 
did not keep the televisions and re-sell them, they were 
deemed “stupid” by this person (presumably, a Thai 
Buddhist and pragmatist) who told the story.
Multi-media is a powerful new tool in the arsenal of 
nationalist policy. Benedict Anderson writes that “ad-
vances in communications technology, especially radio 
and television, give print allies unavailable a century 
ago. Multinational broadcasting can conjure up the 
imagined community to illiterates and populations with 
different mother-tongues.”16  He further adds that 
“above all, the very idea of ‘nation’ is now nestled 
firmly in virtually all print-languages; and nation-ness 
is virtually inseparable from political consciousness.”17 
However, if the media plays a central role in transmit-
ting Thai nationalist ideology to the Muslim southern 
provinces, it is also used extensively throughout the 
south to report news from the greater Islamic world 
about international Muslim issues. And it is this phe-
nomenon of fairly recent occurrence that has  brought 
the Thai Muslim dilemma to the forefront of  interna-
tional consciousness. 
In a brief sketch about how Muslims in the south 
perceive themselves in the broader context of interna-
tional Islam, Chaiwat Satha-Anand analyzed Thailand’s 
Malay Muslim “worldview” as evidenced in the pages of 
independent Muslim magazines and newspapers he 
read within a discrete period of time.  He writes that 
“the Thai Muslims’  perception of the world can be 
properly understood on the basis of three important 
and interconnected factors: the power of the contem-
porary Islamic resurgence; the proximity of Thailand, 
especially the four southernmost provinces, to Malay-
sia; and the ethnic origins of  Muslims in Thailand.”18  
Chaiwat recognizes that external forces,  most notably 
stories channeled through the Islamic media about 
Muslims elsewhere, are significant contributions to the 
ways in which Muslims in the south are able to maintain 
separatism, despite the efforts of Thai media to contain 
it or drown it out entirely.
Education
Historically,  one of the major pillars of government 
policy toward Muslims in the south of Thailand has 
been the imposition of Thai-based curriculum and 
language instruction in public schools. It is no surprise 
then, that recent violence against the Thai state has 
been directed at Thai schoolteachers or toward the 
schools themselves. The Thai educational policy is 
predicated on the mission of providing Thai language 
instruction as a primary way of conveying notions of 
identity to the minority community in the south. How-
ever, this institution, like others that have roots  in pol-
icy formation and official nationalism, has a long his-
tory. 
For the colonial powers of Southeast Asia, educa-
tional policy contributed to an “Indochinese” con-
sciousness, particularly among the French-
administered colonies in Vietnam, Laos and Cambo-
dia, of  which the legacy may be seen in the interplay 
between Thai centralized educational motivations and 
the Malay systems in place in Thailand’s southern prov-
inces. One objective of colonial educational policies 
was to “break existing politico-cultural ties between 
the colonized peoples and the immediate extra-
Indochinese world.”19  When viewed in the context of 
the south of Thailand, the policies of the central Thai 
government seem to differ little in intent from their 
colonial precedents, a factor which has supported the 
claims of “internal colonialism.”
For the most part, Malay Muslim education in the 
south of  Thailand is  centered around the pondok sys-
tem. The pondok is a religious school that transmits  
Islamic education via Malay language and Muslim in-
struction. It has historic and cultural precedents based 
in Malaysia, with which southern Malays in Thailand 
share obvious cultural, linguistic and religious affini-
ties. However,  since the early 1970s the Thai govern-
ment has constructed new Thai-based schools and 
sought to extend improved educational opportunities 
to Thai  Muslims with a corresponding improvement in 
standards. The tampering with traditional Malay forms 
of religious instruction has had a tremendous effect on 
Malay sensibilities and has contributed significantly to 
resentment in the region. 
Interestingly, educational policy as instituted by the 
Thai  government is bound to the notion of moderniza-
tion. That is,  nationalistic educational policies seek to 
secularize, in general, where there had previously been 
religious affiliation. The conflict between Islam and 
modernity is certainly not new, but it is an additional 
element that exacerbates the tensions generated by 
Thai  government policies among the Muslims who are 
forced to accept them. 
William M. Owens
Volume 7, Issue 2, Spring 2007 (Special Edition: Islam in Southeast Asia) ! 29
The lynchpin of educational reform throughout the 
south is language.  The Thai government for many 
years has sought to enforce educational reform policies 
that disregarded the importance of the Malay language 
in the south and that attempted to impose Thai lan-
guage requirements, particularly within the pondok 
system. 
In an essay by Raymond Scupin regarding the educa-
tional policies aimed at fundamentally altering the re-
ligious nature of the pondok, he writes:
In 1961, the Ministry of Education initiated a plan 
to regulate further the pondoks. A research and 
coordinating center was established in Yala in order 
to secularize the pondoks and introduce Thai lan-
guage instruction, policies which were embedded in 
the strategy of patanakorn20. The curriculum was 
restructured for the pondok, and by the end of 1970, 
there were 463 pondoks in the South which were 
formally incorporated into the Thai government 
program. The textbooks were in the Thai language 
and the curriculum included geography, Thai his-
tory, Malay language (although eventually the Ma-
lay language was taken out of the curriculum), 
arithmetic, and Buddhist ethics.21
Here, we have clear evidence of the ways in which the 
pondok system has been compromised by the national-
ist policies of the Thai government program. While the 
intent is to “secularize” the pondok schools and to 
eliminate the Malay language from the curriculum, the 
program nonetheless substitutes Islamic ethics with 
coursework in Buddhist ethics – hardly a secular re-
placement. Fundamental to Muslim identity formation 
in the south is the use of education as  a means of con-
veying important information about Islam as practiced 
in its Southern Thai context; and government policies 
that aim to reconfigure or eliminate such aspects of 
education diminish the importance of the Malay Mus-
lim culture in the south and force alliances with Muslim 
interests outside of the Southeast Asian world.
However, policy initiatives in the southern provinces 
are not implemented without reaction, either explicitly 
expressed or passively resisted.  This  is a consistent 
pattern: the Thai government enacts policies that aim 
to diminish the strengths of traditional systems of gov-
ernance that have been in place in the south for centu-
ries, and the Muslims in turn find ways to circumvent, 
resist or simply ignore such policies. Scupin explains:
In general the response of the To Khrus and ulama 
to these new educational policies has been a re-
strained participation. To preserve the study of 
Islam, they have complied with most of the new 
government regulations, but they have tried to em-
phasize Islamic teachings and reject much of the 
secular courses. This trend has led Thai authorities 
to establish systems of incentives and rewards and 
financial support to those pondoks which adopt 
secularization. This policy has had mixed results. 
One the one hand many of the larger pondoks have 
received awards and financial support from Thai 
authorities. On the other hand many Malay Muslim 
parents send their children to those pondoks who 
teach only Islamic subjects or send them abroad to 
other Islamic countries and regions for education.22 
If the political integration of  southern Thailand is 
one of the goals of national educational policies, in-
cluding their insistence on Thai language instruction 
and secularized reform of traditional modes of  educa-
tion, it is discouraging that the policies have had the 
opposite effect.  Resistance has been an effective means 
for Malay Muslims to preserve traditional forms of re-
ligious instruction, as well as the Malay language, 
which is  used in virtually all other situations of day to 
day life,  excluding the Thai-mandated public school 
curriculum. 
The impetus to send children to other Islamic coun-
tries,  neighboring or otherwise, only serves to divide 
the Muslims further from the Thai nation and to en-
courage Thai Muslims to view themselves as part of  a 
more potent, larger community outside of Thailand. 
Although the Thai government has put in place incen-
tive schemes and various development programs, these 
may have tended to devalue the autochthonous system 
and create economic inequities that are often insur-
mountable. Economic disparity is  one of the major 
reasons for rejecting the Thai educational program, 
even though this  affords the possibility of acceptance 
into a state university and thus better career opportuni-
ties. 
While the economic disparity between Muslims in 
the southern provinces and those living in major urban 
areas in the central part of the country are significant, it 
is  not possible here to delineate the ways in which eco-
nomic differences function in the discussion of this  
relationship. However, briefly stated, the economy of 
the south, long tied to agrarian and fishing industries, 
has essentially dried up, due to the introduction of  
synthetic rubber on internationally dependent com-
modity markets destroying the profitability of  rubber 
plantations (which were previously found throughout 
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the south and the Malay Peninsula in abundance); and 
to over-fishing taxing the natural resources of the seas 
that surround the peninsula. In short,  the economic 
situation of the Muslim population in the south, par-
ticularly when compared to that of central Thailand, 
further exacerbates feelings of resentment and harass-
ment and complicates the nature of the separatist 
movement. It also diminishes any potential for the suc-
cess of  national educational policies which make it 
extraordinarily difficult for Malay-speakers to succeed 
in university entrance exams, which are conducted in 
Thai.
The Use of Violence and the Thai Mili-
tary Response
The final element that has contributed most obvi-
ously to the pattern of action and reaction established 
by ill-defined and ill-conceived policies emanating 
from Bangkok is the reliance on the military to ensure 
compliance and to suppress rebellion. Onerous poli-
cies have resulted in the establishment of resistance 
groups whose agenda is defined by acts of rebellion or 
“terrorism” against the Thai state. The groups are 
various, with names designating and implying unity of 
purpose, but are localized and, relative to the Thai 
military, weak.
Nonetheless, the rebellion in the south has been a 
more serious national security concern since January 
of 2004, when the government officially initiated broad 
security measures in the most troublesome provinces 
by placing them under martial law following a series of 
well-coordinated attacks against military and police 
facilities. In addition,  eighteen schools were attacked 
and burned to the ground in January as well, indicating 
that the rebellion, which was once characterized by 
sporadic acts of banditry without organization, had 
developed increasingly complex ways of using violence 
to attack the centers of Thai authority in the provinces, 
and to attract international attention to cultural and 
social problems in the south of Thailand.
The resistance organizations in southern Thailand 
have historical precedents and important connections 
to Malaysia.  However, the chief objective of these re-
sistance groups seems to be a reunion with Malaysia, 
rather than the creation of an independent and separate 
state.  There are three guerilla movements associated 
with the armed resistance in the south: the Barisan 
Revolusi  Nasional (BRN), the Barisan Nasional Pem-
bebasan Patani (BNPP), the United Front for the Inde-
pendence of Patani  (BERSATU), and the Patani United 
Liberation Organization (PULO). Of the four, PULO 
has the distinction of being supported by outside 
groups in the Middle East and Pakistan.  It purports to 
have a membership that includes 10,000 guerillas and 
its activities have included sporadic violence from the 
1980s onwards,  mostly targeting police buildings and 
public utilities. In addition, it claimed responsibility 
for an assassination attempt on the life of the King of 
Thailand in 1977 during his visit to Yala Province.23 
Generally, however, the resistance groups that have 
dominated the political equation in the southern prov-
inces are irredentist in nature. They seek to reaffirm 
the ethnic and cultural heritage of Malay Muslims in 
the south with their ethnic cognate groups in Malaysia, 
and to throw off the yoke of Thai nationalistic ideology 
and official policy. However, one scholar has recently 
put forth the intriguing theory that the rebellion in the 
south may in fact be a millenarian revolt.  In an article 
published recently,  Nidhi Aeusrivongse maintains that 
the participants in the recent fulmination of hostility 
are predominantly rural, poor and lacking a cogent 
plan to achieve a separate state status or independence. 
He argues that the resistance does little to attract sym-
pathy for the Malay Muslims themselves, and that even 
less religious substance informs the rebellion. He 
writes:
Even if the militants and their movement (including 
organizations that supported them, such as PULO) 
may have wanted to establish an independent Pat-
tani state, up until 28 April these organizations had 
done nothing to make such a political separation 
practically viable under the prevailing conditions in 
the world today. There has been no serious attempt 
to gain the recognition, understanding, and sympa-
thy of the world’s superpowers for a new, would-be 
political entity. There has not even been any dis-
semination to the outside world of the sufferings of 
the Melayu Muslim people under the rule of the 
Thai Buddhist State.24
Nidhi’s argument here is  compelling, but it fails to 
take into consideration the fact that the Thai  govern-
ment’s handling of the events that took place on April 
28, 2004 arguably did more to publicize the plight of 
the Muslims in the south than any of the coordinated 
efforts of resistance groups in the past. Indeed, the 
images of Muslims massacred at a mosque signaled to 
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the world the intent of  deposed Prime Minister Thak-
sin Shinawatra’s administration regarding internal 
security issues,  and the gravity of his commitment to 
stability at any costs.
On April 28th,  2004,25 an uprising occurred in three 
southern provinces, with participation by mostly young 
men wielding knives and machetes who attacked police 
stations and official military outposts. The violence was 
extraordinary in its size and scope. The brunt of the 
battle occurred in and around the Krue-Se Mosque in 
Yala Province. The military reacted by opening fire and 
killing nearly 110 of the rebels, many of whom had 
sought refuge in the mosque. A total of five policemen 
died in the attack. The media coverage of the event was 
extensive, with international media subsequently draw-
ing parallels to the plight of the Palestinians in the 
Middle East. As significant and deadly as this eruption 
of violence had been, it had nonetheless brought 
worldwide attention to what in essence had been a lo-
calized conflict.  For the most part,  this  attention has 
been unwelcome to the Thais,  who, rather than adopt a 
more conciliatory or compromising approach to the 
southern provinces, have since maintained an aggres-
sive stance toward them.
A second major episode in recent events of  southern 
Thailand is equally demonstrative of the accelerating 
nature of the rebellion.  On October 25, 2004, a mass 
demonstration occurred in Tak Bai, a district in Nara-
thiwat province,  when protestors demanded the release 
of six men accused of providing weapons to Muslim 
separatists.  Military officials said the protest crowds 
numbered from 1,500 to 2,000 people. In an effort to 
quash the demonstration, the military rounded up the 
participants, by some counts as many as 1,300. In the 
ensuing arrests, 78 detainees died, apparently suffocat-
ing to death after they were bound, gagged and stacked 
atop each other in military transport vehicles. The im-
ages that were broadcast around the world were indeed 
disturbing, and it seems that the Thai government, in 
its treatment of its citizens in the south, has reached a 
level of military reaction that essentially guarantees 
continued resistance and rebellion in the region.
If it is  true that Islam informs the activities of the 
rebels, then is the rebellion necessarily a religious ex-
pression of dissatisfaction? Nihdi claims that the Mus-
lims in the south lack a codified ideology that could 
sustain a separate Pattani state. He believes that the 
image of  a glorious Pattani has no basis  in reality what-
soever and that the vision that rebels purport to ad-
vance is but a fantasy. Nihdi writes:
Amidst this absence of ideology, the Kreuse 
mosque became the only tangible cultural symbol 
for the villagers. The attempt to revive the Pattani 
kris, or the search for and reproduction of ancient 
technologies, were projects carried out by Thai 
academics (in collaboration with local villagers) 
and were funded by the Thailand Research Fund, 
which is a Thai government agency. It was repre-
sented in the Thai academic community as the local 
culture of the Thai state. There is no context for a 
Pattani state independent of Thai political authority, 
either in the past or in the future. I believe that the 
separatist organizations do dream of an independ-
ent Pattani state, or at least one free of the ‘oppres-
sion’ of the Thai state. But these organizations, and 
especially the militants, have only a vague idea of 
this fantasy.26
The observation, then, that the rebels in the south 
have an idealized, almost utopian vision for which they 
are struggling as their motive, identifies the uprising as 
millenarian in nature. Furthermore,  Nihdi sees no 
basis in historical or political reality for the vision of a 
rebirth of Pattani, and illustrates that any harkening to 
an earlier era and to the glories of the past, have in fact 
been facilitated by the Thai government and are not 
organic to Malay Muslim sensibilities. 
Similarly, Chaiwat Satha-Anand, in his most recent 
work on the subject of the Malay Muslisms, sees the 
Kreu-Se Mosque,  rather than a symbol, as  a complex 
“theater” for the renegotiation of Muslim Malay iden-
tity in the region, and by extension in Thailand itself. 
He cites as evidence its  symbolic power as  a totem of 
Islamic dissatisfaction in direct conflict with its role in 
tourism in the south (it has been promoted as a tourist 
site for Malays), its presence in historical myth-
creation (a powerful association with the shrine of Lim 
Khun Yew), and its role as a place of Islamic worship. 
Chaiwat concludes that the Kreu-Se Mosque is impor-
tant because it is one of a series of theaters in which 
“the politics of identity renegotiation would continue 
to be more relevant to an understanding of a Muslim 
minority’s  relation to changing circumstances than the 
official politics of  conspiratorial actors and clandestine 
foreign intervention.”27
The violence in the south, then, may be seen in this 
context less as an armed resistance underwritten by 
complex Islamic ideals,  and more as a simple peasants’ 
revolt aimed at seeking economic redress for their 
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condition. But, qualitatively, how different is the Mus-
lim vision of the former glory of the Sultanate of Patani 
from the reified vision of Thai unity (reflected within 
hegemonic policy formation) espoused throughout the 
kingdom? Whatever the case, it is certain that the vio-
lence in the south has long term repercussions for the 
Thai  political establishment and for the citizenry as a 
whole. Images of tortured Muslims do little to win the 
good will of  the international community and do far 
less for the image of Thailand as  a powerful member 
nation of  ASEAN, with a diversified population that has 
been developing its economy and infrastructure to 
establish critical links to facilitate international com-
merce.
Thai Muslim Violence in Global 
Perspective
Scholars who study terrorism and modern political 
science have become more concerned that the violence 
in the south is increasingly the result of connections to 
external Islamic extremist groups from other parts of 
the world. However, for the most part, these fears seem 
to be groundless. What has been significant is  the in-
ternational attention that the violence in the south has 
attracted, generally the result of former Prime Minister 
Thaksin Shinawatra’s aggressive stance toward the 
rebellious provinces. The pattern of action and reac-
tion, established by the military and propagated and 
supported by official Thai government policy, has 
served to exacerbate tensions and to draw parallels  with 
conflict elsewhere in the world where Muslims are in-
volved in military conflict. 
The danger is that the distinctions that have kept this 
conflict localized for centuries, i.e., that the Malay 
Muslims merely had wanted to go about daily life main-
taining connections to their cultural heritage, are ren-
dered less clear by the power of multinational and in-
ternational media, which typically show localized con-
flicts in terms of  larger paradigms by reducing them to 
their minimal constituent parts, e.g., Muslim terrorists 
versus Buddhists. In particular, the Muslim rebellion in 
the south becomes a battle in a greater war that has 
more recently become the focus of so much interna-
tional attention. 
In addition to some evidence that PULO has had 
international cooperation from groups in the Middle 
East, Andrew Tan writes that external influence and aid 
on behalf of the Malay Muslims in the south is indeed 
part of the picture. He writes, “An external element is 
present in three forms. The first is the sympathy from 
co-religionists in neighboring Malaysia. The second is 
the link with other Muslim secessionists in the region. 
The third is  the most worrying of all – potential links 
with international militant Islam.”28 While indeed wor-
rying, the third and final aspect of Tan’s analysis  of  
external influence might really be seen as a symptom of 
the Thai government’s military policies directed 
against its Muslim minority. The greater the reaction to 
Muslim displays of political discontent, the greater the 
probability that international focus will shift toward 
Thailand’s troubled provinces. 
Conclusion
In this paper, I have attempted to show the ways in 
which Thai national identity has historically been rei-
fied and applied to its  minority Muslim population, as 
well as the constituents that comprise it. The theoreti-
cal components of national identity have also been 
applied to Thailand’s understanding and vision of itself 
in nationalistic terms. Relative to notions of “Thai-
ness” this paper has included an analysis of the Malay 
Muslim minority in the southern provinces and the 
rebellion that has simmered for centuries. 
The result of this rebellion, which some scholars 
characterize as millenarian in nature, and others see as 
an irredentist, or a unique combination of both,  has 
been increasing political attention directed at the for-
mer Thaksin Shinawatra administration.  This admini-
stration won its reelection bid in an historical first for 
the country since becoming a constitutional monarchy: 
a four year completion of an elected coalition govern-
ment with a subsequent reelection of an incumbent. 
The results of the second term mandate revealed in 
part that the heavy-handed responses to rebellion in 
the south and the expressions of political discontent 
there,  had not, in general, affected the opinion of his 
Thai  Buddhist constituency, which tended to see the 
conflict as a problem created by the Muslims, rather 
than by the Thai government. 
More recently, the domestic political situation in 
Thailand has shown marked signs of fatigue if not ex-
asperation resulting in a swift and complete military 
coup on September 19, 2006,  while instability in the 
southern provinces continues with incidents of spo-
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radic violence. The overthrow of Thaksin Shinawatra 
by the Thai military clearly obviated a protracted pe-
riod of instability in the Thai polity. While Shinawa-
tra’s political crisis was ostensibly the result of allega-
tions of corruption involving the liquidation of his in-
vestment holdings through a shell company based in 
Singapore, it could be concluded that these political 
tensions had the seed of  popular discontent within the 
Muslim soil of the south. Whatever policies the Thai 
military government now pursues in its restive south-
ern provinces in the short term, the issues underlying 
the complexities of Thai Buddhist and Thai Muslim 
relations are likely to remain unchanged.
I have argued that the fundamental problem has been 
a seemingly incomprehensible insistence on Thai edu-
cational and language requirements enforced by offi-
cial Thai policy that separates the Malay Muslims from 
their historical and cultural traditions and forces them 
to either accommodate a completely alien culture, or to 
seek linkages with the “imagined” and “globalized” 
Islamic community beyond the borders of Thailand. In 
addition, the political dissatisfaction of the Malay Mus-
lims stems from the lack of viable opportunities to par-
ticipate in an economy dominated by the needs and 
requisites of urban Thailand. 
While it seems unlikely that there are any real inter-
national agitators fueling the rebellion in the south, 
and even less likely that Islam is the primary cause for 
disparities of  wealth, or that it provides the sole ideo-
logical foundation for the rebellion, there are real and 
growing international concerns that Thailand’s re-
gional rebellion may attract transnational actors who 
see this  conflict simply as a skirmish in a greater global 
“War on Terror.” The real dilemma for the previous 
political administration had been containing the unrest 
in the south before the increasingly desperate insur-
gents began to seek targets further north for their po-
litical expressions of  resentment.  That this is occurring 
now, with crude explosive devices used as bargaining 
chips in the ever-escalating conflict, demonstrates the 
inherent weaknesses and risks when transnational ide-
ologies inform localized conflicts, but are countered by 
aggressive, nationalistic reactions with strong military 
support. It demonstrates, too,  the blurring distinctions 
between global and local theaters of political expres-
sion. 
For the year 2005, the United States State Depart-
ment issued a report on the status of human rights 
throughout the world. The controversial report, which 
posits fundamental human rights as a desirable goal in 
keeping with US policy objectives in disparate regions 
throughout the world, includes a separate, highly de-
tailed report for Thailand alone. In this report29the 
State Department warns against “growing resentment” 
in the southern provinces and details the human rights 
abuses that have resulted from the “Emergency De-
cree” that had authorized military suppression of the 
rebellion. The list of  disappearances, extrajudicial kill-
ings in the south and elsewhere, and acts of violence in 
the region are disheartening indications that identity 
politics remain a fundamental problem in Thailand’s 
political constructions, as are the passages in this re-
port that detail the deliberate targeting of Thai Bud-
dhists  still living in the south and attempting to observe 
their own traditions. 
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